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
ANNEX

### The Production of Political Intelligence in CIA

1. CIA now has four major functions in the field of political intelligence production. These are not totally distinct, but rather arbitrarily divided sections of a spectrum.

- a. Current reporting. This runs from the alerting telephone call through situation reports and current periodicals to substantial background memoranda and short-range assessments.
- b. Estimative writing. This begins at relatively current assessments and runs through estimates proper to the policy-oriented Intelligence Brief.
- c. Research. This is here defined as deep, usually long-range, analysis by highly trained country specialists. It is carried out in support of policy and seeks primarily to develop an understanding of the decision makers and the decision-making process in countries of major interest to the US. The results may occasionally be published as Briefs, but usually as Memoranda or Reports, and often may not be published at all.
- d. Basic. This can be defined as the description of the political processes and institutions of each country by the specialist for the non-specialist. Basic intelligence differs from the "research" product in being encyclopedic and factual rather than selective, speculative and deeply analytic.

2. The Agency is not organized to perform all of these functions with equal effectiveness. Analytic resources in the political field are divided among six organizations on the intelligence side of the house: 25X1



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
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a. The great majority on the ONE Staff are political analysts. They divide their time between drafting and coordinating estimates and writing estimative memoranda on current topics.

b. OCI's analysts, with a few exceptions, are political, although they have military and economic responsibilities on countries OSR and OER do not cover. Their primary mission is current reporting. They are also required to produce political chapters of the NIS and encouraged to produce more sophisticated research studies. The latter, unfortunately, compete with current production for the best analysts. OCI has always believed that it stands or falls on its current performance, and has allocated its resources accordingly.

c. OBGI has a limited political analysis capability in its Country Profile Staff and among the better of its NIS editors.

d. The only organization fully devoted to political research is SRS. Its people are among the best in the Agency as country experts and as deep researchers. Its concept of political research activities, however, is isolated from the intelligence mainstream with an emphasis on historic reconstruction that is not directly useful to the policy maker.



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f. CRS mass-produces biographic materials as a service of common concern. This product is appropriate as reference material but is not adequate for the needs of senior officials who need deeper and broader insights into the factors affecting the conduct of high-ranking foreign officials.

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3. The first four of these organizations overlap in function and use many of the same materials. OCI and ONE do "current" work. OCI, ONE, and SRS do "estimative" work. OCI and SRS



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4. These activities compete for roughly similar professional personnel. There are, however, two measures to be considered. One is competence. Most in-depth political research requires different types of writing skills, analytical capabilities, and more specialized knowledge than is typically required for current reporting and NIS writing. The second measure, however, is equally important, and that is temperament. There are common factors among the OCI and ONE analysts who are writing on current issues and policy-oriented problems which are not shared by the SRS and NIS analysts who work on longer range problems, usually on a project basis. The former at least are more or less interchangeable. There is a lesson here in how to organize the task more logically. There is also a warning that human resources are not infinitely malleable.

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<b>Remarks:</b>  <p>For discussion at a future Management Committee meeting. An earlier version of this proposal was previously distributed in conjunction with MCA-44.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Copy filed</i> MCA-48</p>					
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